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Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin 
136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With today’s American society consisting of the most racially diverse 
citizenry in the country’s history,1 it is not hard to imagine why race-
conscious university admissions programs have created a hotly contested 
controversy.2  The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution guarantees equal treatment under the laws to 
each citizen, regardless of race, and provides that “No State shall . . . deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”3  
Thus, public universities administering racial preference in extending 
enrollment offers exists in a state of uneasy tension with the Equal 
Protection Clause, as members of certain races—and not others—are given 
preference in the admissions process on the basis of race.4  The Supreme 
Court of the United States recently decided the case of Fisher v. University 
of Texas at Austin (hereinafter “Fisher II”), in which the Court upheld as 
constitutionally permissible a public university’s consideration of race in its 
admissions program.5 
Fisher II is just one in a series of cases in which race-conscious 
university admissions programs have been reviewed by the Court.  The 
Court, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, conclusively held 
 
 1. Francisco M. Negrón, Jr., Diversity is Dead. Long Live Diversity: The Racial Isolation Prong 
of Kennedy’s Pics Concurrence in Fisher and Beyond, 24 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 99, 99 (2015-2016) 
[hereinafter Negrón, Diversity is Dead]. 
 2. Johnathan D. Glater, Debt, Merit, and Equity in Higher Education Access, 79 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 93 (2016) [hereinafter Glater, Debt, Merit, and Equity]. 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 4. See Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016) [hereinafter Fisher 
II]. 
 5. Id. 
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that race-conscious admissions programs are “reviewable under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”6  Though a university has a compelling interest in 
promoting the educational benefits of diversity,7 Bakke required that a 
university’s decision to use race-conscious admissions plans meet strict 
scrutiny in order to be consistent with the Equal Protection Clause.8  In 
Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court reaffirmed the proposition that “student body 
diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in 
university admissions.”9  A university must specifically and narrowly tailor 
its goals in achieving racial diversity.10 
In Fisher II, the petitioner, a Caucasian female, applied for a seat in the 
University of Texas at Austin’s 2008 freshman class and was rejected.11  
She then challenged the University of Texas at Austin’s consideration of 
race as part of its admissions program on the grounds that it “disadvantaged 
her and other Caucasian applicants, in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.”12  The Court ultimately held that the University of Texas at 
Austin’s race-conscious admission plan was constitutionally permissible, as 
it was narrowly tailored to pursue the University’s interest in promoting the 
educational benefits that spring from student body diversity.13  Despite 
language from the first instance of the case in Fisher (hereinafter “Fisher 
I”), requiring a reviewing court to give a university no deference in 
determining whether its goals are narrowly tailored in pursuing student 
body diversity,14 the Court in Fisher II articulated that “considerable 
deference is owed to a university in defining those intangible characteristics, 
like student body diversity, that are central to its identity and educational 
mission.”15 
The dissent was highly critical of the majority’s application of the 
restrictions set out in Fisher I, stating that the Court had granted the 
University of Texas at Austin “blind deference . . .” in determining whether 
its goals were narrowly tailored, as required by strict scrutiny.16  
Furthermore, the dissent stated that the University of Texas at Austin’s 
 
 6. 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1979). 
 7. Id. at 314-15. 
 8. Id. at 299, 357. 
 9. 539 U.S. 307, 325 (2003) (The Court upheld the University of Michigan’s consideration of 
race as part of its holistic review as constitutionally permissible). 
 10. Id. at 333 (citing Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996)). 
 11. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2207. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 2214. 
 14. Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2012) (citing Grutter, 539 
U.S. at 333) [hereinafter Fisher I]. 
 15. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2214. 
 16. Id. at 2216. 
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goals were vague,17 concluding that the majority’s opinion constituted 
“affirmative action gone wild.”18 
Despite the decades of controversy surrounding the use of race-
conscious plans in university admissions,19 Fisher II clarifies that such race-
based considerations are here to stay, at least for the foreseeable future.20 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Prior to the 1997 academic year, the University of Texas at Austin 
(hereinafter “the University”) reviewed each applicant by taking into 
consideration the following two criteria: (1) an applicant’s SAT score and 
high school performance, called an applicant’s “Academic Index” (AI); and 
(2) consideration of an applicant’s race.21  “Preference was given to racial 
minorities.”22  However, in response to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Hopwood v. Texas,23 the University 
adopted a race-neutral admissions plan.24  This modified plan continued to 
measure an applicant’s AI, but added a new element, the “Personal 
Achievement Index” (PAI), which assigned a numerical score based on the 
holistic review of an applicant.25  The PAI was made up of an applicant’s 
“essays, leadership and work experience, extracurricular activities, 
community service, and other ‘special characteristics’ that might give the 
admissions committee insight into a student’s background.”26 
Following the decision in Hopwood, the Texas legislature enacted the 
“Top Ten Percent Law.”27  The Top Ten Percent Law required the 
University to offer enrollment to any applicant who graduated in the top ten 
percent of his or her high school graduating class.28  The goal of the law was 
to increase minority admissions within the University.29  The University 
 
 17. Id. at 2223 (stating that “By accepting these amorphous goals as sufficient for [the University 
of Texas at Austin] to carry its burden, the majority violates decades of precedent rejecting blind 
deference . . .”). 
 18. Id. at 2232. 
 19. Graton, Debt, Merit, and Equity, supra note 2, at 93. 
 20. Todd Henderson, Symposium: What Proof Should We Demand to Justify Racist Policies?, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2016, 10:04 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-what-proof 
-should-we-demand-to-justify-racist-policies/ [hereinafter Henderson, Symposium: What Proof Should 
We Demand]. 
 21. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2205. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See 78 F.3d 932, 934-35, 948 (5th Cir. 1999) (The University’s consideration of race was 
declared unconstitutional, as it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 24. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2205. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id.; see TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 2015). 
 28. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2205. 
 29. See Negrón, Diversity is Dead, supra note 1, at 107. 
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implemented the Top Ten Percent plan in 1998.30  The University filled the 
majority of the available seats in its freshman class through satisfaction of 
the Top Ten Percent plan,31 and the remainder of the class was filled 
through combined review of an applicant’s AI and PAI scores.32 
The University utilized this plan until 2003, when it created the plan 
pertinent to the case.33  Following the Court’s ruling in Grutter and Gratz v. 
Bollinger,34 the University modified its admission plan for the final time.35  
Grutter upheld the University of Michigan’s holistic review of its 
applicants, taking into consideration race as a factor, but did not use a 
mechanical allocation of points based on race.36  The University, after 
finding that its admission of minority students had stagnated during the 
Hopwood regime,37 modified its admission program to allow race to be 
considered as a relevant factor.38  The University then adopted its current 
admissions review program, which continued to admit 75% of applicants 
through the Top Ten Percent plan, but also implemented holistic review to 
fill the remaining 25% of the incoming class.39  The holistic plan used a 
combination of an applicant’s AI and PAI scores, but also considered race 
as a relevant factor.40  Under holistic review, the applicant was assigned a 
“Personal Achievement Score” (PAS) in order to give the admissions 
committee total insight into an applicant’s “special characteristics” that 
made the applicant a unique candidate.41  These “special characteristics” 
included: 
the socioeconomic status of the applicant’s family, the 
socioeconomic status of the applicant’s school, the applicant’s 
family responsibilities, whether the applicant lives in a single-parent 
home, the applicant’s SAT score in relation to the average SAT 
 
 30. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2205. 
 31. Id. at 2206 (The Top Ten Percent plan was ultimately capped to allow no more than 75% of 
the freshman class to be filled through the plan). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id.; see 539 U.S. 244, 279-80 (2003) (The Court in Gratz struck down the University of 
Michigan’s admissions program, which allocated “predetermined points to racial candidates”). 
 35. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2206. 
 36. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337, 343-44. 
 37. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2205-06 (The University conducted a year-long study to determine 
whether its admissions program was promoting student body diversity, concluding that its post-
Hopwood race-neutral admission program was insufficient). 
 38. Id. (This plan followed in the wake of the decision in Grutter permitting consideration of race 
in holistic review of applicants.). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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score at the applicant’s school, the language spoken at the 
applicant’s home, and, finally, the applicant’s race.42 
The University used the consideration of race as a “factor of a factor of 
a factor” and claimed that race was introduced only in determining an 
applicant’s PAS.43  Furthermore, all applicants whose total admission 
score—based on AI, PAI, and PAS—was above a certain cut-off were 
automatically admitted; admissions officers granting enrollment based on 
the cut-off threshold were unaware of an applicant’s race when the 
determination was made whether to admit an applicant.44  The University 
further claimed that the consideration of race as a factor was “individualized 
and contextual” in nature.45 
In 2008, Abigail Fisher (hereinafter “Petitioner”), a Caucasian female 
ranked outside the top ten percent of her high school graduating class, 
applied for admission to the University and was rejected.46  Petitioner then 
filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Texas, challenging the University’s use of race in its admissions program on 
the grounds that the admissions plan violated the Equal Protection Clause.47  
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the University, 
finding no constitutional violation.48  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling based on the University’s “good 
faith” effort to implement a race-conscious admissions plan in conformity 
with the Equal Protection Clause.49  The Supreme Court of the United States 
granted certiorari and held that the Court of Appeals’ use of a “good faith” 
analysis was the incorrect constitutional standard to be applied when 
reviewing whether a university’s consideration of race in its admissions 
program is consistent with the Equal Protection Clause.50  The Court 
instructed the Court of Appeals on remand to determine whether the 
University’s race-conscious plan complied with the requirements of strict 
scrutiny—the correct judicial standard to be applied—and whether the 
University’s implementation of a race-conscious program was narrowly 
 
 42. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2206. 
 43. Id. at 2207. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Abigail Noel FISHER, Petitioner, v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, et al., 2015 
WL 9919333 (U.S.), 40 (U.S. Oral. Arg., 2015) (Counsel for the University in responding to Justice 
Alito’s question of whether it can be determined which students were admitted on the basis of race). 
 46. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2207. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id.; see Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 247 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding 
that the “University’s decision to reintroduce race-conscious admission was adequately supported by the 
‘serious, good faith consideration’ required by Grutter”). 
 50. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2421. 
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tailored to achieving the goal of pursuing student body diversity.51  On 
remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed,52 and the Court granted certiorari to 
hear the case for the second time in Fisher II.53 
III. COURT’S DECISION AND RATIONALE 
A. Majority Opinion by Justice Kennedy 
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by 
Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor;54 Justice Kagan 
took no part in the decision.55  In Part II of the Court’s opinion, Justice 
Kennedy analyzed the “three controlling principles” set forth by Fisher I in 
determining whether a public university’s consideration of race in its 
admissions programs is constitutionally permissible.56  First: 
‘[r]ace may not be considered [by a university] unless the 
admissions process can withstand strict scrutiny . . . Strict scrutiny 
requires the university to demonstrate with clarity that its purpose 
or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and 
that its use of the classification is necessary . . . to the 
accomplishment of its purpose.’57 
Second, a university’s decision to pursue “‘the educational benefits that 
flow from student body diversity . . .’” is largely a measure of “academic 
judgment.”58  Due to such a decision being an “academic judgment,” a 
university is given “some, but not complete, judicial deference . . .” and 
must provide a “‘reasoned, principled explanation . . .’” based on the 
University’s “‘experience and expertise . . .’” that it would benefit from 
seeking student body diversity.59 
Finally, the University must show that its method of using race-based 
consideration in its admissions program was “narrowly tailored to achieve 
 
 51. Id. at 2421-22. 
 52. See Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 660 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 53. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2207. 
 54. Id. at 2204. 
 55. Id.; see Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students (Sponsored by Bloomberg Law): 
Justice Kagan’s Recusals, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 9, 2012, 9:50 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/ 
scotus-for-law-students-sponsored-by-bloomberg-law-justice-kagans-recusals/ (Justice Kagan, acting as 
then-Solicitor General, filed an amicus brief on behalf of the Department of Justice as the case was 
pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and she recused herself from 
deciding on the case). 
 56. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2207-08. 
 57. Id. at 2208 (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2418). 
 58. Id. (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419). 
 59. Id. (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419). 
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the University’s permissible goals.”60  On this point, however, Justice 
Kennedy clarified that Fisher I mandated that a university receive “no 
deference . . . ,” and the University bears the ultimate burden in proving that 
non-racial alternatives were insufficient or infeasible.61  Despite this burden, 
the University was not required to show that every conceivable race-neutral 
plan is insufficient, nor does narrow tailoring “‘require a university to 
choose between maintaining a reputation for excellence [and] fulfilling a 
commitment to provide educational opportunities to members of all racial 
groups . . .’”62 
Justice Kennedy began Part III of the opinion by highlighting the fact 
that the University’s race-conscious admissions plan is unique and distinct 
from other admissions plans reviewed by the Court in the past.63  The 
University’s implementation of the Top Ten Percent Law in its admissions 
review was the single most important factor in determining whether 
Petitioner would be admitted to the University.64  Despite the weight and 
importance of the Top Ten Percent plan in admissions determinations, 
Petitioner never challenged it, and instead accepted it as a given premise.65  
Because the University was not able to discontinue the use of the Top Ten 
Percent plan, as it was mandated by law, combined with the fact that the 
University had limited data on the success of its holistic review for 
admissions, remand for further fact-finding would have produced marginal, 
if any, results.66  Thus, according to Justice Kennedy, the Court was 
necessarily limited to the narrow issue of “whether, drawing all reasonable 
inferences in her favor, petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence that she was denied equal treatment at the time her application was 
rejected.”67 
After narrowing the issue, Justice Kennedy addressed—and ultimately 
rebutted—each of Petitioner’s four arguments in Part IV of the opinion.68  
Petitioner’s first argument was that the University had failed to “articulate[] 
its compelling interest with sufficient clarity.”69  The University, according 
to Petitioner, had failed to more precisely clarify the point at which it would 
reach a “critical mass” of minority student enrollment.70  Justice Kennedy  
 60. Id. (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419-20). 
 61. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2208 (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2419-20). 
 62. Id. (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 2208-09. 
 65. Id. at 2209. 
 66. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2209. 
 67. Id. at 2210. 
 68. Id. at 2210-14. 
 69. Id. at 2210. 
 70. Id.; see Abigail Noel FISHER, Petitioner, v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, et al., 
2015 WL 9919333 (U.S.), 49 (U.S. Oral. Arg., 2015) (Counsel for the University argued that it was 
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made clear that achieving a “critical mass” of minority student enrollment 
for the purposes of promoting diversity was not a measure that could be 
reduced to pure numbers, quotas, or percentage-based systems.71  However, 
Justice Kennedy stated that merely “asserting an interest in the educational 
benefits of diversity writ large is insufficient.  A university’s goals cannot 
be elusory or amorphous—they must be sufficiently measurable to permit 
judicial scrutiny of the policies adopted to reach them.”72 
Justice Kennedy looked to University officials’ articulation of the 
ultimate goals in using a race-conscious admissions plan to achieve student 
body diversity.  The University stated in its 2004 admissions plan that it 
sought to realize “the destruction of stereotypes, ‘promot[ion of] cross-
racial understanding,’ the preparation of a student body ‘for an increasingly 
diverse workforce and society,’ and the ‘cultivat[ion of] a set of leaders with 
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry.’”73  Justice Kennedy stated that such 
goals “mirror[ed] the ‘compelling interest’ this Court has approved in prior 
cases . . .”74 and were concrete enough to establish that the University had 
demonstrated a “‘reasoned, principled explanation . . .’” for its desire to 
pursue such goals, as required by Fisher I.75 
Concluding that Petitioner had failed to contest the sufficiency of the 
University’s goals,76 Justice Kennedy next turned to Petitioner’s second 
argument.  Petitioner claimed that the University’s consideration of race in 
its admissions program was unnecessary, as the University had already 
achieved its desired “critical mass” of minority student enrollment by 
2003.77  The University had implemented its race-conscious holistic review 
plan after concluding that the level of minority enrollment had stagnated 
during the Hopwood regime.78  It also found that minority students 
experienced feelings of loneliness and isolation during this period.79  
According to Justice Kennedy, these factors were persuasive in proving that 
the University had not yet achieved its diversity goals.80 
 
evident that, by 2004, the University had failed to reach “critical mass,” providing justification for the 
University’s race-based plan). 
 71. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2210. 
 72. Id. at 2211. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419). 
 76. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2211. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 2212 (The University studied the racial make-up of classes with five or more students 
and found that, in 2002, 52% of such classes had no African-American students, and 12% of such classes 
had no Hispanic students). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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Justice Kennedy next turned to Petitioner’s third argument, in which she 
claimed that the University’s consideration of race in its admissions 
program was unnecessary as its effects would be minimal.81  Justice 
Kennedy again turned to a study undertaken by the University in 2003.  
This study found that between 2003 and 2007, enrollment of African-
American and Hispanic students increased by 54% and 94% respectively as 
a result of the University’s consideration of race in its holistic review 
program.82  Justice Kennedy rebutted Petitioner’s third argument, stating 
that such increases, although minor, did have a meaningful effect on the 
University in promoting student body diversity.83  Moreover, the minor 
impact of the consideration of race was not fatal to the narrow tailoring 
analysis.84  In fact, according to Justice Kennedy, the small role that race-
consciousness played in the University’s admissions should be a “hallmark 
of narrow tailoring, not evidence of unconstitutionality.”85 
Justice Kennedy then addressed Petitioner’s fourth and final 
argument—that race-neutral alternatives existed and could have been 
implemented by the University before resorting to race-conscious 
consideration in admissions decisions.86  In the wake of the Hopwood 
decision, the University increased its outreach and scholarship efforts, as 
well as its budget for recruiting events.87  None of these efforts, according to 
the University, were successful in attaining the compelling interest in 
achieving student body diversity.88  Furthermore, Petitioner recommended 
that the University could have uncapped its Top Ten Percent plan.  
However, Justice Kennedy pointed out that such plans, though appearing 
race-neutral, are created for the singular goal of promoting minority 
enrollment.89 
In addition to demonstrating the race-conscious effect of the Top Ten 
Percent plan, Justice Kennedy also emphasized that such plans rely on 
academic performance in high school as a single metric, ignoring the 
intangible characteristics of an applicant.90  For instance, according to 
Justice Kennedy, such a plan would exclude talented athletes and musicians, 
 
 81. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2212. 
 82. Id. (The study showed that in 2003, 11% of Texas residents enrolled through holistic review 
were Hispanic and 3.5% were African-American, compared to 16.9% and 6.8%, respectively, in 2007). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2212. 
 87. Id. at 2213. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (Percentage plans are 
“adopted with racially segregated neighborhoods and schools front and center stage . . . It is race 
consciousness, not blindness to race, that drives such plans”). 
 90. Id. 
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or talented students who struggled due to a family crisis before improving 
their grades just to fall shy of the top ten percent.91  These plans are “blunt 
instrument[s] . . . ,” according to Justice Kennedy, in “deep tension with the 
goal of educational diversity as this Court’s cases have defined it.”92  Such 
plans, by their very nature, exclude students who would otherwise 
contribute to student body diversity.93  Furthermore, Justice Kennedy stated 
that if universities utilized percentage plans in the method advocated by 
Petitioner, such a practice would encourage parents to keep their students in 
racially-identifiable schools and discourage students from taking more 
challenging classes.94  Justice Kennedy then concluded his analysis of 
Petitioner’s final argument, finding that Petitioner had failed to show any 
workable race-neutral alternatives that could be utilized by the University in 
achieving its goals; therefore, the University had met its burden in showing 
that its race-conscious admissions policy was narrowly tailored when 
Petitioner’s application was rejected.95 
In concluding the opinion of the Court, Justice Kennedy emphasized the 
fact that universities are “in large part defined by those intangible ‘qualities 
which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for 
greatness.’”96  Most importantly, however, Justice Kennedy articulated 
that—due to these immeasurable qualities—courts owe considerable 
deference to a university in determining such intangible characteristics that 
make it unique.97  However, despite this deference, striking a balance 
between the pursuit of diversity and the Constitution’s promise of equal 
protection remains a challenge.98  It is up to universities to experiment in 
striking this subtle balance.99 
Despite considerable deference, and the University’s interest in striking 
a balance between student body diversity and the Equal Protection Clause, 
Justice Kennedy ended the opinion with a caveat: the University of Texas 
has an ongoing responsibility to continually scrutinize the negative and 
positive effects of its admissions program, and must continually reassess the 
need for a race-conscious admissions policy.100 
 
 91. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2213. 
 92. Id. at 2213-14 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340). 
 93. Id. at 2213. 
 94. Id. at 2214 (citing Gratz, 539 U.S. at 304, n.10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). 
 95. Id. (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2420). 
 96. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2214 (citing Sweat v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950)). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 100. Id. at 2214-15. 
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B. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Thomas 
Justice Thomas joined in Justice Alito’s dissent,101 but wrote separately 
to clarify his belief that the majority’s opinion was a radical departure from 
the Court’s precedents.102  Moreover, Justice Thomas cited his own 
concurring opinion from Fisher I to reaffirm the point that “a State’s use of 
race in higher education admissions decisions is categorically prohibited by 
the Equal Protection Clause.”103  Finally, Justice Thomas articulated that the 
academic nature of promoting diversity does not change the constitutional 
imperative and clarified that he would have overruled the Court’s decision 
in Grutter.104 
C. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Alito 
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, wrote 
the 51-page dissenting opinion.105  Justice Alito began the dissent by 
reviewing what the Court held in Fisher I.106  Justice Alito stated that Fisher 
I required that the University meet strict scrutiny in determining the 
necessity of a race-conscious admissions program as a compelling interest, 
and that its goals in achieving such a purpose were narrowly tailored.107  
The Court rejected in Fisher I the notion that deference was owed to the 
University in meeting the strict scrutiny standard for adopting race-
conscious admissions programs as a compelling interest.108  However, 
Justice Alito emphasized that the University had failed to specify the 
interests that would be furthered by implementing its race-conscious 
admissions program, and that the majority had granted a “plea for deference 
that we emphatically rejected in [Fisher I].”109 
Justice Alito then elaborated on the University’s failure to prove that its 
consideration of race actually added to classroom diversity.110  Furthermore, 
the University failed to define when “critical mass” would be reached, as 
such a measure is not an absolute number.111  Perhaps most striking, 
however, was Justice Alito’s criticism of the University in claiming the Top 
Ten Percent plan used by the University admitted the “wrong kind of 
 
 101. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2215 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 102. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 103. Id. (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Thomas, J., concurring)). 
 104. Id. (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343); see Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2428. 
 105. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2215 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 2216 (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2411). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2216 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 111. Id. 
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African-American and Hispanic students . . .” as these students typically 
come from poor high schools, and the University desires African-American 
and Hispanic students from wealthy families.112  Such a premise was 
founded on the idea that poor African-American and Hispanic students 
admitted through the Top Ten Percent plan were not forced to compete with 
white students—an “insulting stereotype not supported by the record.”113  
Justice Alito went on to clarify that affirmative action was created to help 
the disadvantaged; justifying consideration of race on the premise that 
helping disadvantaged minorities hurts wealthy minorities is, according to 
Justice Alito, “affirmative action gone wild.”114 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Alito reviewed the Court’s 
jurisprudence regarding the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment on the 
consideration of race in university admissions programs.  Justice Alito made 
clear that “racial neutrality is the driving force of the Equal Protection 
Clause . . . .”115  Such racial classification can only survive constitutional 
muster if it meets strict scrutiny and is narrowly tailored to achieving a 
compelling interest;116 the government is required to clearly demonstrate 
that its compelling interest is both substantial and constitutionally 
permissible.”117 
Justice Alito went on to state that the University had failed to 
demonstrate with clarity its stated purpose in pursuing student body 
diversity as a compelling interest.118  Justice Alito was highly critical of the 
University’s “critical mass” formulation, stating that it was vague and 
undefined.119  Such a nebulous goal is not permissible to justify the 
consideration of race in admissions programs, and the University, therefore, 
could not meet strict scrutiny.120  In addition, Justice Alito emphasized that 
the majority ignored Court precedent by allowing the University to state 
broadly and imprecisely its goals in achieving student body diversity, failing 
to satisfy the strict scrutiny analysis.121  Although the Court’s precedents did 
not require the University to articulate a specific number of minority 
students enrolled, its proposed goals were simply not concrete enough to 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 2217. 
 114. Id. at 2232. 
 115. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2220-21 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 
488 U.S. 469, 518 (1989)). 
 116. Id. at 2221 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327). 
 117. Id. at 2222 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2418). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2222-23 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 735 (2007)). 
 121. Id. at 2223-24. 
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withstand strict scrutiny.122  Justice Alito went on to say that “‘the 
destruction of racial stereotypes, the promot[ion of] cross-racial 
understanding, the preparation of a student body for an increasingly diverse 
workforce and society, and the cultivat[ion of] a set of leaders with 
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry . . .” are “laudabale goals . . .,” but are 
too vague and lack the requisite specificity to withstand constitutional 
scrutiny.123 
Next, Justice Alito was highly critical of the University’s use of 
demographic data, stating that the University had premised diversity on 
mere racial census.124  Justice Alito pointed to such measuring of racial 
minorities as racial balancing, which was held in Fisher I to be “‘patently 
unconstitutional.’”125  Similarly, Justice Alito was highly critical of the 
majority in not addressing the issue of fewer Asian-American students in 
certain classes than there were Hispanic students, stating that the majority 
must have found such disparate treatment “benign, since Asian-Americans 
are overrepresented at [the University].”126  This information was based on 
a classroom study that the University used in justifying its giving preference 
to African-American and Hispanic students.127  Justice Alito articulated that 
such unequal treatment between Hispanic students and Asian-American 
students was discriminatory, and was a result of the University’s crude and 
overly simplistic classroom study.128  Justice Alito further clarified that the 
University considered all Asian-American students as a monolithic body, 
failing to differentiate on the basis of ethnicity or nationality, constituting a 
group consisting of 60% of the world’s population.129  Such a disparity was 
difficult for Justice Alito to reconcile, as the majority found that the 
University’s interest in preventing feelings of isolation and loneliness in 
minority students was a compelling interest.130  Because of this 
contradiction, and the University’s vague interest in preventing feelings of 
isolation and loneliness, the University’s consideration of race in its 
admissions program did not meet strict scrutiny.131 
 
 122. Id. at 2222-23. 
 123. Id. at 2223. 
 124. Id. at 2225. 
 125. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2225 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419). 
 126. Id at 2228. 
 127. Id. at 2226 (The small class study found that in classes with five or more students, 52% had 
no African-American students, 16% had no Asian-American students, and 12% had no Hispanic 
students.  This university concluded after completion of the study, that it had not yet met its goal of 
achieving classroom diversity.). 
 128. Id. at 2229. 
 129. Id. at 2229. 
 130. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2235-36 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 131. Id. at 2235. 
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Justice Alito next addressed whether the University’s purpose and goal 
in achieving student body diversity satisfied the narrowly tailored approach 
mandated by Fisher I.132  Even if, as the University contended, Grutter only 
required the statement of a “generic interest in the educational benefits of 
diversity . . . ,” the University’s plan failed to be narrowly tailored in 
achieving that interest.133  Justice Alito emphasized that the University 
could implement a race-neutral holistic review, in addition to the top ten 
percent plan, and would still be successful in enrolling students who could 
contribute to dynamic diversity.134 
Finally, Justice Alito turned to the majority’s three justifications for 
straying from its traditional view of the strict scrutiny standard.135  First, he 
called “dangerously incorrect . . .” the majority’s proposition that further 
fact-finding would be useless, as there was only a three-year period of study 
upon which to base whether its admissions plan unfairly disadvantaged 
Petitioner at the time of her application for enrollment.136  However, this 
goes against the strict scrutiny mandate from Fisher I, requiring a university 
to bear the burden to show its race-neutral efforts were inadequate before it 
can justify using a race-conscious program.137  The majority had essentially 
granted the University a “three-year grace period for racial 
discrimination.”138 
The majority’s second justification for moving from the normal strict 
scrutiny analysis, according to Justice Alito, was that the University could 
not choose to discontinue the Top Ten Percent plan, and therefore, had no 
interest in keeping data on the types of students enrolled through it.139  
However, since the case had been in litigation since 2008, and Fisher I was 
decided in 2012, the University was well aware of its burden to show that 
race-neutral alternatives were not sufficient—lack of choice in 
implementing the Top Ten Percent plan did not dispose of this burden.140  
Justice Alito then made an interesting point: the University had been less 
than forthright with its admission policies, as a 2014 investigation showed 
 
 132. Id. at 2236 (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2420 (stating narrow tailoring requires “a careful 
judicial inquiry into whether a university could achieve sufficient diversity without using racial 
classifications”)). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 2236-37 (stating that such a race-neutral holistic review would still enable the 
University to “admit the ‘star athlete or musician whose grades suffered because of daily practices and 
training . . .” in rebutting the majority’s support of the University’s consideration of race to enroll 
students who possess talents undetectable to grade point metrics). 
 135. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2238-39 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 136. Id. at 2239. 
 137. Id. (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2420). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2239-40 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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that the University frequently admitted well-connected students and 
intentionally destroyed records leading back to this clandestine practice.141  
The University claimed, however, that it was not in the practice of admitting 
such “legacy” students.142  Moving along, Justice Alito criticized the 
majority for excusing the University from producing records that could be 
used to concretely measure the amount of minority students enrolled 
through both the Top Ten Percent plan and holistic review.143 
The third justification for limiting strict scrutiny from Fisher I was 
more simple: the case had gone on for eight years and Petitioner had since 
graduated from a different university.  Such considerations may have 
justified dismissal, but had no bearing on the merits of the case.144 
Justice Alito then concluded his dissenting opinion, ultimately stating 
that the majority’s decision was “remarkable—and remarkably wrong.”145  
Justice Alito further clarified that strict scrutiny and narrow tailoring require 
a university to prove with clarity its compelling interest in achieving student 
body diversity; however, the University had failed to precisely show any 
such goal.146  What was at stake, according to Justice Alito, was “whether 
university administrators may justify systematic racial discrimination 
simply by asserting that such discrimination is necessary to achieve ‘the 
educational benefits of diversity,’ without explaining—much less proving—
why the discrimination is needed or how the discriminatory plan is well 
crafted to serve its objectives.”147 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Introduction 
The Court’s decision in Fisher II comes thirteen years to the day after 
Justice O’Connor predicted in Grutter in 2003 that within twenty-five years, 
the consideration of race in university admissions decisions would no longer 
be necessary in this country.148  Roughly half-way into the life expectancy 
 
 141. Id. at 2240 (referencing the Kroll Report from 2014, which uncovered the secret practice of 
university officials to override normal holistic review to admit politically connected individuals.  
Records for students admitted in this manner were destroyed in an effort to hide any paper trail.). 
 142. Abigail Noel FISHER, Petitioner, v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, et al., 2015 
WL 9919333 (U.S.), 51 (U.S. Oral. Arg., 2015) (Counsel for the University: “University of Texas does 
not do legacy, Your Honor”). 
 143. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2240-41 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 144. Id. at 2242. 
 145. Id. at 2243. 
 146. Id. at 2242-43. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 310; see Stuart Taylor, Symposium: Extrapolating from Fisher – Racial 
Preferences Forever, SCOTUSBLOG (June 23, 2016, 4:42 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/ 
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of affirmative action, however, Fisher II stands for the proposition that the 
consideration of race in university admissions is here to stay.149  Both 
Fisher I and Grutter recognized that achieving student body diversity 
constitutes a compelling interest for public universities.150  In order for a 
university to prove that its compelling interest is reconcilable with the Equal 
Protection Clause, its consideration of race in admissions decisions must 
meet “strict scrutiny” and be “narrowly tailored” in achieving its purpose.151  
The Court’s jurisprudence also gives some, though not total, deference to a 
university in determining that the consideration of race in academic 
decisions is necessary for attaining student body diversity,152 but grants no 
deference to the University in determining whether its goals in promoting 
student body diversity satisfy the narrow tailoring analysis.153 
The majority’s opinion in Fisher II seems to provide two departures 
from this approach: (1) the requirements of strict scrutiny and narrow 
tailoring have been relaxed; and (2) near complete judicial deference is 
given to a university in implementing race-consciousness in its admission 
decisions.154  This note will examine the majority’s analysis of the 
University’s goals in complying with strict scrutiny and narrow tailoring in 
the context of prior case law, discuss the expansion of judicial deference in 
affirmative action decisions, and explore the potential future impact that 
Fisher II may have on subsequent affirmative action litigation. 
B. Discussion 
1. Strict Scrutiny and Narrow Tailoring: Bakke and Beyond 
Initially, it should be noted that Fisher I and Grutter still hold 
precedential value as good case law in affirmative action jurisprudence.155  
However, the majority’s opinion in Fisher II departs from these cases, as 
well as others, by relaxing the restrictions on race-based university 
admissions plans imposed by strict scrutiny and narrow tailoring.156 
 
symposium-extrapolating-from-fisher-racial-preferences-forever/ [hereinafter Taylor, Symposium: 
Extrapolating from Fisher]. 
 149. See Taylor, Symposium: Extrapolating from Fisher, supra note 148. 
 150. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2418 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324 (“student body diversity is a 
compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions”)). 
 151. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2208 (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2418-20). 
 152. Id. (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419). 
 153. Id. (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419-20). 
 154. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2216, 2238-39 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 155. See John Paul Schnapper-Casteras, Symposium: Moving Forward from Fisher II, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2016, 5:13 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-moving-
forward-from-fisher-ii/ [hereinafter Schnapper-Casteras, Symposium: Moving Forward]. 
 156. See Elizabeth Slattery, Fisher v. UT-Austin and the Future of Racial Preferences in College 
Admissions, 17 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 22, 25 (2016) [hereinafter Slattery, Fisher v. UT-Austin]. 
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In 1978, the Court in Bakke invalidated an admissions program utilized 
by the University of California, Davis, in which its medical school 
admissions committee set aside sixteen out of 100 seats for 
underrepresented minorities.157  However, the Court in Bakke permitted 
universities to use racial preference in its admissions decisions to promote 
“the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student 
body.”158  The Court’s permission to consider race in admissions decisions 
did not come without limitation.  A university’s consideration of race must 
meet strict scrutiny to be consistent with the express guarantees of the Equal 
Protection Clause, for when government decisions “touch upon an 
individual’s race or ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial 
determination that the burden he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely 
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.”159 
In 2003, the Court reaffirmed this position in Grutter, clarifying that 
any use of racial classification in university admissions must meet strict 
scrutiny in order to pass constitutional muster.160  Such racial classifications 
are only permissible if they are narrowly tailored in achieving a compelling 
governmental interest.161  The Court ultimately upheld the University of 
Michigan Law School’s race-conscious holistic admissions review because 
the benefits articulated by the University in administering its admissions 
program promoted “cross-racial understanding . . .” leading to the “break 
down [of] racial stereotypes . . . ,” helping students to “better understand 
persons of different races.”162 
Justice Kennedy in Fisher I then adopted this test as the correct judicial 
standard to be applied when reviewing a university’s decision to implement 
the consideration of race in its admissions policies.163  In Fisher I, Justice 
Kennedy laid out the framework to be used as derived from Grutter and 
Bakke, requiring that a university’s consideration of race in admissions 
program meet strict scrutiny to be constitutionally permissible, be narrowly 
tailored in achieving those ends, and be demonstrated with clarity and 
specificity.164  These compelling interests served far beyond attaining 
student body diversity, and facilitated the “lessening of racial isolation and 
stereotypes . . .” while promoting “enhanced classroom dialogue . . . .”165 
 
 157. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265. 
 158. Id. at 305, 357. 
 159. Id. at 299. 
 160. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inv. v. Pená, 515 U.S. 200, 227 
(1995)). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 330. 
 163. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2421. 
 164. Id. at 2418. 
 165. Id. 
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Despite these express limitations, Justice Kennedy upheld in Fisher II 
the University’s consideration of race without any seemingly concrete, 
specific, or measurable goals.166  Justice Kennedy pointed out that merely 
“asserting an interest in the educational benefits of diversity writ large is 
insufficient.  A university’s goals cannot be elusory or amorphous—they 
must be sufficiently measureable to permit judicial scrutiny of the policies 
adopted to reach them.”167  These goals included: “ending stereotypes, 
promoting ‘cross-racial understanding,’ preparing students for ‘an 
increasingly diverse workforce and society,’ and cultivating leaders with 
‘legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry . . .’”168 
Thus, put bluntly, so long as a university can articulate certain 
“buzzwords” as justification for its adoption of race-based admissions 
policies, its affirmative action plan will survive constitutional scrutiny.169  
The problem with permitting such goals to satisfy narrow tailoring, as 
Justice Alito pointed out, is that they are exactly the type of “amorphous,” 
immeasurable goals that Justice Kennedy warned against in the majority 
opinion.170  Moreover, Justice Kennedy deeply criticized vague goals in 
Parents Involved, stating such abstract goals are “so broad and imprecise 
that they cannot withstand strict scrutiny.”171 
How, then, is a university to clearly articulate its goals in pursuing the 
educational benefits of diversity?  The upside to Justice Kennedy’s allowing 
such goals to survive judicial scrutiny is that it alleviates the “catch-22” 
problem universities often face in establishing diversity as a compelling 
interest.172  It is impermissible for a university to implement racial balancing 
in the form of percentage quotas or demographic comparisons,173 but 
equally impermissible for a university to put forth “amorphous” or 
immeasurable goals in its justification for pursuing the benefits that come 
with diversity.174  With this in mind, Justice Kennedy’s opinion grants 
universities some breathing room to pursue diversity for the “commonsense 
proposition that diversity along various lines – including racial diversity – 
yields significant educational benefits on college campuses.”175 
 
 166. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2223 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 167. Id. at 2211. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See Slattery, Fisher v. UT-Austin, supra note 156, at 25. 
 170. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2223 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 171. Id. at 2223-24 (citing Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 785 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment)). 
 172. See Schnapper-Casteras, Symposium: Moving Forward, supra note 155. 
 173. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2208, 2210. 
 174. See id. at 2211. 
 175. See Schnapper-Casteras, Symposium: Moving Forward, supra note 155. 
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2. Granting Considerable Deference to Universities in 
Affirmative Action Review 
Perhaps the most striking implication following the wake of the Court’s 
decision in Fisher II is that universities are now granted “considerable 
deference . . .” in determining whether a race-conscious admissions policy 
is necessary for the promotion of student body diversity.176  Justice Kennedy 
made it abundantly clear in Fisher I that a university’s decision to pursue 
the benefits of diversity is substantially an “academic judgment to which 
some, but not complete, judicial deference is proper.”177  However, “no 
deference is owed when determining whether the use of race is narrowly 
tailored to achieve the University’s permissible goals.”178 
As stated earlier, Justice Kennedy looked to the goals the University 
had laid out in order to achieve student body diversity, citing “ending 
stereotypes, promoting ‘cross-racial understanding,’ preparing students for 
‘an increasingly diverse workforce and society,’ and cultivating leaders with 
‘legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry . . . .’”179  However, Justice Kennedy 
relied on the University’s statement that it had tried race-neutral 
alternatives—albeit unsuccessfully—in making its argument that its 
consideration of race was narrowly tailored to achieve its permissible 
goals.180  Moreover, Justice Kennedy rebutted Petitioner’s argument that the 
University’s admissions policy was not narrowly tailored because the 
consideration of race played a minimal impact on admissions decisions.181  
However, Justice Kennedy relied on studies undertaken by the University as 
well as anecdotal evidence offered by faculty and administrators, in 
demonstrating that the University had not yet reached its “critical mass.”182 
Justice Alito was highly critical of the majority’s opinion upholding the 
University’s justification that it had not yet attained a “critical mass” of 
minority student enrollment, as the University never defined, with any 
reasonable amount of clarity or precision, when “critical mass” would be 
reached.183  Justice Alito went on to say that the University would know it 
when it sees that “critical mass” had been reached, stating “in other words: 
Trust us.”184  According to Justice Alito, the majority granted the 
 
 176. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2214. 
 177. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329). 
 178. Id. at 2419-20. 
 179. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2211. 
 180. Id. at 2213. 
 181. Id. at 2212. 
 182. Id at 2211-12. 
 183. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct at 2216 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 184. Id. at 2222. 
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University’s “plea for deference—indeed, for blind deference—the very 
thing that the Court rejected in Fisher I.”185 
Although Justice Kennedy cited Fisher I in stating that no deference 
was owed to a university when reviewing whether its goals were narrowly 
tailored,186 in actuality, near complete deference was granted to the 
University in allowing it to permit evidence from studies, as well as 
anecdotal evidence, in arguing that its goals survived the narrow tailoring 
analysis.187  It seems that by upholding immeasurable goals, couched in a 
“critical mass”188 only identifiable by the University, the majority has 
mandated that future courts will defer to a university in showing that its use 
of race is narrowly tailored—a possibility that should have been precluded 
by the Court’s clear rejection of such deference in Fisher I.189  Ultimately, 
Justice Kennedy trusted the University on its word that “critical mass” had 
not yet been attained.190  Because universities should be open to 
experimentation in testing both the negative and positive effects of the 
consideration of race in pursuing student body diversity,191 the strict 
standard of giving no deference to universities when determining if its goals 
are narrowly tailored has been abandoned in Fisher II.192 
 
 185. Id. at 2215. 
 186. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2208. 
 187. See Elizabeth Slattery, Symposium: A Disappointing Decision, but More Lawsuits Are on the 
Way, SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2016, 1:13 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-a-
disappointing-decision-but-more-lawsuits-are-on-the-way/ [hereinafter Slattery, Symposium: A 
Disappointing Decision] (stating that, although judges must not defer to a university when determining if 
its use of race is narrowly tailored, this part “lost any teeth it may have had because Kennedy’s opinion 
lets schools provide scant evidence”). 
 188. See Peter N. Kirsanow, Race Discrimination Rationalized Again, 2016 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 
59, 63 (2016) (stating “[w]hat is critical mass?  Who knows?  It is a question that apparently does not 
interest the majority.  In failing to require UT Austin to define ‘critical mass,’ Justice Kennedy has given 
universities broad license to engage in racial discrimination in pursuit of the elusive critical mass”). 
 189. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2223 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that “Courts will be required to 
defer to the judgment of university administrators, and affirmative action policies will be completely 
insulated from judicial review”); see also Taylor, Symposium: Extrapolating from Fisher, supra note 
148; Henderson, Symposium: What Proof Should We Demand, supra note 20; Kirsanow, supra note 188, 
at 64 (stating “[t]hese [goals] are nothing more than fuzzy obfuscations.  If these goals are considered 
sufficiently specific to constitute a compelling interest, almost any goal short of ‘We want to engage in 
blatant racial balancing’ will constitute a compelling interest”). 
 190. See Slattery, Fisher v. UT-Austin, supra note 156, at 25. 
 191. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2214. 
 192. See id. at 2223 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also Taylor, Symposium: Extrapolating from 
Fisher, supra note 148; Kirsanow, supra note 188, at 60 (stating that the Court’s “decision missed the 
opportunity to enforce the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny on which Justice Kennedy appeared 
so keen in Fisher I”). 
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3. The Future Impact of Fisher II on Affirmative Action 
Litigation 
Justice Kennedy concluded the opinion of the Court with a limitation: 
the University has an ongoing obligation to continually reevaluate and 
scrutinize its need to consider race in its admissions decisions.193  However, 
it is ultimately left to universities—and not the courts—to strike the fragile 
balance between conforming with the Equal Protection Clause and pursuing 
the nation’s interest in promoting student body diversity.194  It would 
appear, although not with crystal clarity, that courts will have difficulty 
invalidating affirmative action programs in the future under the framework 
set forth in Fisher II.195 
Any university admissions policy being challenged in the future may 
withstand a court’s constitutional review, so long as it can mimic the 
University’s goals as outlined in Fisher II.196  Goals such as “promoting 
cross-racial understanding . . .” and “preparing students for an increasingly 
diverse workforce . . .” are sufficient under the Fisher II framework to 
prove that a university’s decision to consider race in its admission policy 
withstands strict scrutiny.197  Such goals, according to Justice Kennedy, fall 
in line with the Court’s prior articulations of a university’s compelling 
interest in achieving student body diversity.198  Because such goals are 
constitutionally permissible, universities in the future can fall in line with 
the University of Texas to survive constitutional scrutiny, citing to its own 
evidence that, in its academic opinion, “critical mass” has not yet been 
attained.199  Although the Court’s decision in Fisher II did not much—if at 
all—change existing case law,200 the Court’s decision ensures that the life 
expectancy of affirmative action programs in this country has been 
extended, potentially indefinitely.201  For the time being, universities across 
the country have been granted permission to continue to consider race in 
admissions decisions.202 
 
 193. Id. at 2214-15. 
 194. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2214; see also Slattery, Symposium: A Disappointing Decision, 
supra note 187. 
 195. See Taylor, Symposium: Extrapolating from Fisher, supra note 148; see also Henderson, 
Symposium: What Proof Should We Demand, supra note 20 (stating that the Court “did not say in so 
many words that the justices will bless virtually every racial preference plan that comes before them”). 
 196. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2211. 
 197. See id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See Slattery, Fisher v. UT-Austin, supra note 156, at 25. 
 200. See id. 
 201. Schnapper-Casteras, Symposium: Moving Forward, supra note 155; see Taylor, Symposium: 
Extrapolating from Fisher, supra note 148. 
 202. See Slattery, Symposium: A Disappointing Decision, supra note 187. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Fisher II expands further the already controversial topic of the 
consideration of race in university admissions decisions.203  In upholding 
the University’s race-conscious holistic review of its potential applicants, 
the Court reaffirmed that a university’s pursuit of student body diversity 
serves a compelling interest.204  The legacy that Fisher II leaves behind is 
that ultimately, affirmative action programs are here to stay, expanding 
Justice O’Connor’s prior expectation that such policies would no longer be 
necessary within twenty-five years.205  Though the Court articulated in 
Fisher II that a university admissions program must meet strict scrutiny and 
be narrowly tailored,206 universities are required to be given “considerable 
deference . . .” by reviewing courts in striking the balance between ensuring 
the rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause and pursuing the 
educational benefits that flow from student body diversity.207  Thus, Fisher 
II serves to give a university substantial leeway in determining for itself 
whether the consideration of race is necessary in its admissions policies, and 
in deciding how to implement such a policy in furthering its pursuit of 
attaining student body diversity.208 
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 203. See Glater, Debt, Merit, and Equity, supra note 2, at 93. 
 204. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2211. 
 205. See Schnapper-Casteras, Symposium: Moving Forward, supra note 155. 
 206. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2207-08. 
 207. Id. at 2214. 
 208. See id.; see also Schnapper-Casteras, Symposium: Moving Forward, supra note 155. 
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